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I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 29, 2013, the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free 
Trade Zone (Shanghai FTZ) officially opened.2  The Shanghai FTZ 
offers a number of special rules and potential advantages as a 
location in mainland China for investments from foreign 
enterprises.3  In October 2013, in conjunction with the establishment 
of the Shanghai FTZ, the Shanghai International Arbitration Center 
4 (SHIAC) set up the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone Court 
of Arbitration (FTZ Arbitration Court) to resolve disputes in the 
Shanghai FTZ that relate to investment, trade, finance, intellectual 
property and real estate. 5   The FTZ Arbitration Court was 
established in the hopes that it will play a role in attracting foreign 
investment into the Shanghai FTZ, as arbitration is seen as a more 
desirable dispute resolution option than Chinese domestic courts.6  
 
                                                
2 See Associated Press in Beijing, China opens Shanghai free-trade zone, THE GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 29, 2013, 7:40 AM EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/29/china-
shanghai-free-trade-zone/. 
3 See China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone - A new era of opening up and reform in 
China, PWC CN (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.pwccn.com/home/eng/sh_pftz_paper_nov2013.html. 
4 Upon the approval by the Shanghai Municipal Government and with the agreement of the 
Shanghai Commission for Public Sector Reform, the China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission Shanghai Sub-commission (CIETAC Shanghai) officially 
became the Shanghai International Arbitration Center (SHIAC) in 2013. SHIAC currently 
has a panel of more than 600 arbitrators, of which almost 200 are from foreign countries. 
See Introduction, SHIAC, http://www.shiac.org/English/About.aspx?tid=2 (last visited Dec. 
1, 2014). 
5 See Announcement of The China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone Court of Arbitration, 
SHIAC (Oct. 30, 2013) available at 
http://www.shiac.org/English/Announcement.aspx?nid=573 (announcing the establishment 
of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone Court of Aribtration as open for operations). 
6 See Zhou Wenting, Shanghai FTZ tribunal opens to boost trade, CHINA DAILY (last 
updated Nov. 6, 2013, 12:33 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-
11/06/content_17083787.htm (reporting the opening of the Shanghai Free Trade 
Zone tribunal which will provide judicial services to investors in the zone.). 
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On April 8, 2014, SHIAC published a new set of arbitration 
rules, the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone Arbitration Rules 
(FTZ Arbitration Rules),7 effective on May 1, 2014.8  The FTZ 
Arbitration Rules are intended to apply to contractual and other 
disputes over rights and interests in property whether or not they are 
related to the Shanghai FTZ.9  Moreover, the FTZ Arbitration Rules’ 
expedited arbitration mechanism introduces several distinctive 
reforms favorable to foreign businesses operating in China and 
should come as welcome news to businesses eager to avoid drawn-
out legal battles.10 
 
The FTZ Arbitration Rules will apply where (a) the parties 
have agreed to refer their disputes to SHIAC and have opted for the 
FTZ Arbitration Rules to apply to the parties, legal facts, or subject 
matter of the dispute concerning the Shanghai FTZ, unless the 
parties agree otherwise; or (b) the parties have agreed to refer 
disputes to the FTZ Arbitration Court or have referred disputes to 
SHIAC to be conducted by the FTZ Arbitration Court, unless the 
parties agree otherwise.11  
 
There are a number of differences between the FTZ 
Arbitration Rules and other institutional arbitration rules in China.12  
The main differences are that the FTZ Arbitration Rules contain: 
Broader provisions for interim relief, including pre-arbitration 
interim relief; 
                                                
7 Zhongguo (Shanghai) Ziyou Maoyi Shiyanqu Zhongcai Guize (中国（上海）⾃自由贸易
试验区仲裁规则) [China（Shanghai）Pilot Free Trade Zone Arbitration Rules] 
(promulgated by SHIAC, effective May 1, 2014) 
http://www.shiac.org/ENGLISH/Guide.aspx?tid=12&nid=616 [hereinafter FTZ 
Arbitration Rules]. 
8 See Zhou Wenting, FTZ arbitration rules published, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 9, 2014, 
07:15AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-04/09/content_17417152.htm.  
9 See Jelita Pandjaitan & Justin Tang, Shanghai Free Trade Zone implements modern 
arbitration rules, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (July 2, 2014), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/07/02/shanghai-free-trade-zone-implements-
modern-arbitration-rules. 
10 See Matthew J. Zito, Shanghai FTZ Paves the Way for Arbitration Reform in China, 
CHINA BRIEFING (June 20, 2014), http://www.china-
briefing.com/news/2014/06/20/shanghai-ftz-paves-way-arbitration-reform-china.html. 
11 Pandjaitan & Tang, supra note 9. 
12 Other institutional arbitration rules in China include: China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) Arbitration Rules, SHIAC Arbitration Rules, 
and Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA) Arbitration Rules. 
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Provisions for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator to 
rule on applications for urgent interim relief before the constitution 
of the tribunal in the main proceedings (Emergency Arbitrator 
Procedure); 
More substantive provisions regarding the appointment of 
arbitrators from outside SHIAC's panel of arbitrators (Open-List 
Arbitrator Appointment); 
Expanded provisions for the consolidation of arbitrations 
and joinder of parties; 
Express provisions for mediation to be conducted by a 
mediator, as an alternative to the tribunal conducting the mediation, 
and the establishment, by SHIAC, of a panel of mediators; and 
A de minimis threshold of RMB 100,000 for the summary 
procedure to apply under which the dispute will be determined by a 
sole arbitrator and an award rendered within 3 months (rather than 
within 6 months under the standard procedure) 13, and a small claims 
procedure for claims that do not exceed RMB 100,000. 14 
 
This paper focuses on two of the new features of the FTZ 
Arbitration Rules mentioned above: emergency arbitrator procedure 
and open-list arbitrator appointment.  This paper examines these 
two new features in detail through a particular lens, a comparative 
analysis of how various sets of institutional arbitration rules in the 
world, including the FTZ Arbitration Rules, address the issues 
associated with emergency arbitrator procedure and open-list 
arbitrator appointment.  
 
Section I.A will establish the conceptual ground for 
emergency arbitrator procedure with a particular focus on the 
fundamental principles transcending different institutional 
arbitration rules.  Section I.B will explore in detail how three major 
arbitration institutions’ rules govern emergency arbitrator procedure, 
namely the International Chamber of Commerce Rules (ICC Rules), 
the International Centre for Dispute Resolution Rules (ICDR Rules), 
and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre Rules (SIAC 
                                                
13 See Pandjaitan & Tang, supra note 9 (parenthetical needed) . 
14 See Friven Yeoh, et al., Arbitrating Under SHIAC's New China (Shanghai) Pilot Free 
Trade Zone Arbitration Rules, O'MELVENY & MYERS (Jun. 16, 2014), 
http://www.omm.com/arbitrating-under-shiac-new-china-shanghai-pilot-free-trade-zone-
arbitration-rules/ (highlighting key features under the new FTZ Rules). 
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Rules). 15   Section I.C will discuss the provisions in the FTZ 
Arbitration Rules governing emergency arbitrator procedure, while 
comparing these provisions to the relevant provisions in ICC Rules, 
ICDR Rules, and SIAC Rules.  Section I.D will conclude with a few 
suggestions for further refinement of the provisions regarding 
emergency arbitrator procedure under the FTZ Arbitration Rules.  
Section II.A will introduce two basic party-appointed methods of 
arbitrator appointment in institutional arbitration practice, namely 
closed-list arbitrator appointment and open-list arbitrator 
appointment.  Section II.B will assess the pros and cons of each 
method of arbitrator appointment and compare them with each other.  
Section II.C will demonstrate Chinese arbitration institutions’ long-
time practice of using closed-list arbitrator appointment.  Section 
II.D will discuss the new provisions in the FTZ Arbitration Rules 
that have adopted open-list arbitrator appointment for the first time 
among all Chinese arbitration institutions and will make 
recommendations for refinement. 
 
 
II. EMERGENCY ARBITRATOR PROCEDURE 
A. Conceptual Background for Emergency Arbitrator Procedures 
International arbitration has grown significantly in the last 
50 years as commercial parties seek to minimize the potential 
uncertainties of local litigation procedures. 16   Unlike traditional 
litigation, international arbitration is completely voluntary.17  The 
arbitral tribunal's power over the parties derives directly from the 
                                                
15 Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
effective Jan. 1, 2012) http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-
ADR/Arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/, art. 29, app. V [hereinafter ICC Rules]; 
Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC), 
effective Apr. 1, 2013) http://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules, art. 26, sched.1 [hereinafter SIAC 
Rules]; International Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the International Centre for 
Dispute Resolution (ICDR), effective May 1, 2006) 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_002037,  art. 37 
[hereinafter ICDR Rules]. 
16 See Frank M. Young, III, International Commercial Arbitration, Southern Style, 74 ALA. 
LAW. 119, 119 (2013). 
17 See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (2008). 
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parties' arbitration agreement.18  Moreover, international arbitration 
is a private dispute resolution system and parties to an international 
arbitration agreement have control over many different procedural 
elements that are invariably beyond their control when litigating a 
dispute in court.19  These elements include control over the number 
of arbitrators, the choice of the arbitrators (or at least the manner in 
which they will be chosen),20 whether the arbitration will take place 
through an arbitration institution or be conducted ad hoc,21 where 
the arbitration will take place,22 and the language in which the 
arbitration will be conducted.23  Arbitration ensures that neither 
party has a “home court advantage,” thereby creating a more neutral 
forum than a court in either party's country could offer.24 
 
Although international arbitration in general has many 
advantages over resolving conflicts through litigation, the 
international arbitration process does have some shortcomings, 
including the inability of parties to appeal decisions, limited 
discovery, and the limited power an arbitrator has to force 
compliance with deadlines and other requests.25  In addition to these 
disadvantages, arbitration institutions historically did not offer a 
remedy in cases where emergency relief was necessary prior to the 
formation of the tribunal—a process that can take months.26  This 
can be a dangerous position to be caught in as it is at this crucial 
point that a party will likely be most desperate to obtain interim 
relief.  This creates the most significant interim relief problem in 
international arbitration.27  If a party has already applied to begin an 
arbitration proceeding but an arbitral tribunal has not been 
appointed, the party faces two challenges before obtaining any type 
of relief.  First, a tribunal has to be appointed and second, the actual 
                                                
18 Id. at 2. 
19 Id. at 1. 
20 Id. at 42–3. 
21 Id. at 9. 
22 See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (2008) at 43.  
23 Id. at 43–4. 
24 Id. at 1. 
25 Id. at 4–5.  For a discussion regarding the advantages and disadvantages of international 
arbitration, see also RICHARD GARNETT ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2000). 
26 See William Wang, Note, International Arbitration: the Need for Uniform Interim 
Measures of Relief, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1059, 1080 (2003). 
27 Id. 
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arbitration proceedings must take place.28  These challenges tend not 
to bode well for a party seeking emergency relief before the 
arbitration proceedings.29 
 
“If a party cannot obtain pre-tribunal emergency relief 
through arbitration, [the party] is forced to turn back to the courts,”30 
an option with many drawbacks.  For example, the relief sought 
may not be available; court proceedings may be public, lengthy, and 
costly, and may veer in unexpected directions; furthermore, a 
foreign party may fear that a national court will be biased in favor 
of its nationals.31   Therefore, as the demand for interim relief 
escalates, many arbitration institutions have recently begun to offer 
a solution to protect the rights of the parties during the critical 
period between filing a case and constituting the tribunal.32  In 
general, arbitration institutions have developed two procedures to 
address this situation: (1) expediting the formation of the tribunal; 
and (2) appointing an emergency arbitrator specifically authorized 
to hear the application before the tribunal is formed.33  While both 
procedures are viable solutions, most arbitration institutions prefer 
the use of emergency arbitrator procedure to determine applications 
for interim relief before the arbitral tribunal is constituted.  As a 
result, most major arbitration institutions have revised their rules 
accordingly to incorporate procedures for the appointment of 
emergency arbitrators.34  
 
Emergency arbitrator procedure enables parties to seek 
interim relief prior to the formation of the tribunal, without having 
to resort to national courts.35  As emergency arbitrator procedure has 
                                                
28 See Erin Collins, Pre-Tribunal Emergency Relief in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 10 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 105, 108 (2012). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 See Guillaume Lemenez & Paul Quigley, The ICDR’s Emergency Arbitrator Procedure 
In Action, Part I: A Look at the Empirical Data, 63-OCT DISP. RESOL. J. 60, 62 (2008). 
32 See Martin Davies, Court-Ordered Interim Measures in Aid of International 
Commercial Arbitration, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 299, 300–3 (2006) (exp paren); see also 
Collins, supra note 27, at 108. 
33 See Peter J.W. Sherwin & Douglas C. Rennie, Interim Relief Under International 
Arbitration Rules and Guidelines: A Comparative Analysis, 20 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 317, 
321–2 (2009). 
34 See Grégoire Marchac, Interim Measures in International Commercial Arbitration 
Under the ICC, AAA, LCIA and UNCITRAL Rules, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 123, 126 
(1999). 
35 Id. 
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become an increasingly popular tool, it is worthwhile to highlight 
some fundamental concepts embedded in various institutional 
arbitration rules.  First, most arbitration institutions apply the 
provisions of the emergency arbitrator only to parties that are either 
signatories of the arbitration agreement that is relied upon or 
successors to such signatories.36  “This rule was designed to exclude 
investment treaty arbitrations and to prevent possible abuse by third 
parties.”37  Notably, most emergency arbitrator provisions will not 
apply by default to every arbitration.38  Rather, most emergency 
arbitrator provisions only apply if a number of other conditions exist.  
In particular, the emergency arbitrator provisions will not apply 
when the parties agreed to opt out of the respective provisions, or 
when the parties agreed on some other emergency relief procedure.39  
Second, emergency arbitrator or other type of interim relief is 
usually sought by a party who,  
[B]elieves it will suffer imminent harm due to an 
irreparable alteration of the status quo. Examples 
include the adversary's continued violation of 
copyright or patent rights or misappropriation of 
trade secrets; danger to party property in the 
custody of the adversary; and danger that the 
adversary will dispose of its own property, leaving 
the party without a meaningful chance of recovery 
in arbitration.40  
 
Third, another issue of interest is the impact of emergency 
arbitrator procedure on the concurrent jurisdiction of a competent 
court or the arbitral tribunal.  As for court proceedings, emergency 
arbitrator procedure is not envisaged to represent an exclusive 
remedy and, in general, the option of (or indeed submission to) 
those proceedings does not operate as a waiver of judicial authority 
over the matter.41  In respect to the arbitral tribunal, jurisdiction is 
                                                
36 See e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29(5). 
37 See Dieter A. Hofmann, New Rules on International Arbitration, FOR THE DEFENSE 12, 
14–5 (May 2012). 
38 Id. 
39 See e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29(6). 
40 See Ira. M. Schwartz, Interim and Emergency Relief in Arbitration Proceedings, 63-
APR DISP. RESOL. J. 56, 58 (2008). 
41 See Richard Allan Horning, Interim Measures of Protection, Security for Claims and 
Costs;  Commentary on the WIPO Emergency Relief Rules (In Toto), 9 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 
155, 163–4 (1998); see also Sheppard& Townsend, Holding the Fort Until the Arbitrators 
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entirely protected.  Most institutional arbitration rules are clear that 
orders or awards of emergency arbitrators do not bind the 
subsequently constituted arbitral tribunal, and that those tribunals 
are empowered to reconsider, modify, terminate or annul the order 
or award of an emergency arbitrator.42 
 
Finally, assuming that a party is awarded the relief it seeks, the 
next key issue that arises is enforcement.  Questions remain 
regarding the applicability of national arbitration laws to pre-arbitral 
procedures and the extent to which courts will enforce orders or 
awards made by emergency arbitrators.43  None of the many arbitral 
rules limit arbitrators to the traditional remedies provided in the 
procedural law of the place of arbitration.  However, it should be 
noted that the enforcement of innovative measures could prove 
difficult if the state where enforcement is sought is not familiar with 
these kinds of interim measures.44  Ultimately, this will likely turn 
upon whether emergency arbitrators are deemed to be “arbitrators,” 
for the purposes of arbitration legislation, granting relief in the 
course of “proceedings.” 45   Alternatively, there is a purposive 
approach, which recognizes that the primary purpose of arbitration 
legislation is to respect the parties’ agreement to arbitrate their 
disputes, and this would appear to lend support in favor of the 
enforcement of emergency arbitrators’ orders and awards.46  
B. Emergency Arbitrator Procedure Under ICC, SIAC and ICDR 
Rules 
                                                                                                           
Are Appointed: The New ICDR International Emergency Rule, 61-JUL DISP. RESOL. J. 74, 
76 (2006). 
42 See Horning, supra note 41, at 165. 
43 See Marianne Roth, Interim Measures, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 425, 425 (2012); see also 
Marchac, supra note 34, at 128. 
44 See Marchac, supra note 34, at 128. 
45 Generally, arbitrators have 
[W]ide discretion in deciding whether the requested measure is 
appropriate or necessary.  The recent trend of arbitral rules and 
national arbitration acts is to vest the arbitrators with express powers to 
order interim awards.  As an exception to this general tendency, 
however, some national laws still accord exclusive jurisdiction to order 
interim measures to their domestic courts, such as Finland, Greece, 
Italy, and Thailand  . . . .”  
Marchac, supra note 34, at 129. See also ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 28(1) (2012); 
ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 21(1) (2006).. 
46 See MARTIN DOMKE ET AL., DOMKE ON COM. ARB. § 24:6 (2014). 
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As emergency arbitrator procedure has developed as a 
common practical alternative, many arbitration institutions have 
adopted some type of rules to address a party's need for emergency 
relief.47  These rules vary in comprehensiveness and in strategy.  
The emergency arbitrator rules of the International Chamber of 
Commerce International Court of Arbitration (ICC), the Singapore 
International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), and the American 
Arbitration Association International Center for Dispute Resolution 
(ICDR), are discussed below. 
The International Chamber of Commerce International Court of 
Arbitration 
In 1990, the ICC launched its “Pre-Arbitral Referee 
Procedure”—arguably the first attempt by a major arbitration 
institution to provide emergency relief procedure prior to the 
constitution of the tribunal.48  While the 1998 revision of the ICC 
Rules added provisions allowing applications for urgent measures to 
be made directly to courts, the ICC’s most recent amendments 
provide the ICC Rules with an internal mechanism for dealing with 
emergency arbitrator procedure.49 
On January 1, 2012 these latest amendments became effective.  The 
ICC's emergency arbitrator (ICC’s EA) rules are found in Article 29 
of ICC Rules and supplemented by Appendix V50.  Article 29, 
contains some general rules about when emergency arbitration 
procedure is appropriate, but refers to Appendix V for specific 
information on the procedure for an application for an emergency 
arbitrator.51  This new set of rules contains the most comprehensive 
set of emergency relief procedures of all institutional arbitration 
rules.52  
 
The ICC’s EA rules are extremely detailed.  First, ICC’s EA 
rules apply automatically to parties that have opted to arbitrate their 
dispute under the ICC Rules with specific requirements to be met: 
(a) the application is submitted prior to the transmission of the file 
                                                
47 See Wang, supra note 26, at 1075. 
48 See Hofmann, supra note 37, at 12. 
49 See Shai Wade et al., The Revised ICC Arbitration Rules: Seeking Greater Efficiency 
and Transparency, 28 No. 1 CORP COUNS QUARTERLY ART 1 (2012). 
50 ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29, app.V. 
51 Id. 
52 See Collins, supra note 28, at 115. 
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to the arbitral tribunal; (b) the arbitration agreement was concluded 
after January 1, 2012; and (c) there is no agreement of the parties to 
opt-out of emergency arbitrator procedure.53  Second, ICC’s EA 
rules are not intended to prohibit any party from seeking urgent 
interim or conservatory measures from a competent judicial 
authority.54  Third, in order to avoid misuse of ICC’s EA rules, the 
application of the rules has been narrowed to situations where a 
party seeks relief that truly cannot wait for the constitution of an 
arbitral tribunal. 55   Fourth, only signatories to the arbitration 
agreement or their successors can invoke ICC’s EA rules,56 which 
provides the responding party with a certain degree of protection.  
Finally, Appendix V dictates that the appointment of an emergency 
arbitrator should take place as soon as possible, normally within two 
days of receipt of the application.57  If a party wishes to challenge an 
appointment, it must do so within three days of receipt of the 
appointment. 58   After the appointment is made, the emergency 
arbitrator must establish a procedural timetable for the proceedings 
as soon as possible, normally within two days of getting the file.59  
Under the ICC’s EA rules, an emergency arbitrator’s decision is 
rendered in the form of an order,60 which is binding on the parties 
and which the parties must undertake to comply with.61  Since the 
ICC’s EA rules are silent on the enforcebility of an order issued by 
emergency arbitrors, it is unclear whether such orders have the same 
legal effect as an order for interim measures rendered by an arbitral 
tribunal.  
The Singapore International Arbitration Center 
The SIAC was established in 1991.62 The rules the SIAC is 
currently using went into force on April 1, 2013.63  Under the SIAC 
Rules, the parties may seek interim relief prior to the constitution of 
                                                
53 ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29(56). 
54 Id. art. 29(7). 
55 Id. art. 29(1). 
56 Id. art. 29(5). 
57 Id. app. V, art. 2(1). 
58 Id. app. V, art. 3. 
59 ICC Rules, supra note 15, app. V, art. 5(1). 
60 ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29(2); Id. app.V, art. 6(1). 
61 ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29(2); Id. app.V, art. 6(6). 
62 See About Us, SIAC, http://www.siac.org.sg/2014-11-03-13-33-43/about-us (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2014). 
63 See Our Rules, SIAC, http://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules (last visited Apr. 23, 2014) (exp). 
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the tribunal.64  Schedule 1 to the SIAC Rules provide that a party in 
need of relief may make an application for emergency interim relief 
prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, provided it is done 
concurrently with or following the filing of a Notice of Arbitration.65  
It should be noted from the outset that these procedures apply to the 
relevant arbitration agreements by default, meaning that there is no 
requirement for the parties to opt in to their availability.66 
 
The Chairman of SIAC must appoint an emergency 
arbitrator within one business day of receipt of the application.67  
The emergency arbitrator then must, within two business days of 
appointment, establish a schedule for considering the application.68  
The emergency arbitrator has the “power to order or award any 
interim relief that he deems necessary.”69  He also has the power to 
“modify or vacate an interim award or order for good cause 
shown,”70 but has no more power after the tribunal is constituted.71 
Although the SIAC Rules provides an emergency arbitrator with 
broad discretionary powers to award any interim relief deemed 
necessary, the emergency arbitrator has no power to act after the 
tribunal is constituted, and any relief granted by the emergency 
arbitrator expires and ceases to be binding after 90 days if the 
tribunal is not constituted.72  Additional jurisdictional protection is 
afforded to the subsequently-constituted tribunal, as it is not bound 
by any determination made by the emergency arbitrator.  The 
tribunal can reconsider, modify or vacate any interim award or relief 
issued by the emergency arbitrator.73  The expiration of the order or 
award rendered by the emergency arbitrator is unique under the 
SIAC's rules. 
 
In terms of uncertainties over whether orders and awards 
made by emergency arbitrators are enforceable or not, the Singapore 
Parliament introduced amendments to the International Arbitration 
                                                
64 SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1.  
65 SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(1). 
66 See Collins, supra note 28, at 111-2. 
67 SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(2). 
68 SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(5). 
69 SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(6). 
70 Id. 
71 SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(7). 
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
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Act (“IAA”) on April 9, 2012.74  The amendments make clear that 
awards and orders given by emergency arbitrators are enforceable in 
Singapore.75  The amendments have accorded emergency arbitrators 
the same legal status as that of a regularly-constituted arbitral 
tribunal. This legislative amendment distinguishes Singapore from 
other jurisdictions as it provides clarity that is otherwise unavailable 
in most other jurisdictions.76  It should be noted, however, that 
uncertainty remains as to the enforceability of orders and awards 
outside Singapore.77 
The American Arbitration Association International Center for 
Dispute Resolution 
The ICDR was founded by the American Arbitration Association 
(“AAA”) in 1996 to provide international access to the mediation 
and arbitration services provided by the AAA. 78   The ICDR 
administers all of the AAA's international matters and the ICDR 
Rules apply whenever the parties' agreement calls for AAA 
arbitration but does not choose a particular set of AAA rules.79  
 
The ICDR provides a pre-tribunal emergency arbitrator 
procedure whereby parties may, in urgent situations, apply to the 
ICDR to seek relief prior to the formation of the tribunal.80  This 
emergency arbitrator procedure is outlined in Article 37 of the 
ICDR Rules.81  Article 37(a) states that it applies to all arbitrations 
under the ICDR Rules that are “conducted under arbitration clauses 
                                                
74 See Subramanian Pillai & Kaushalya Rajathurai, Singapore: Recent Amendments to the 
International Arbitration Act, MONDAQ, 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/179938/International+Courts+Tribunals/Recent+Amendments+
to+the+International+Arbitration+Act/(last updated June 3, 2012). 
75 Id. (extending the scope of the definition of “arbitral tribunal” will be extended to 
expressly include Emergency Arbitrators appointed subject to, and in compliance with, the 
rules of arbitration agreed. This serves to clarify that any interim measures ordered by an 
Emergency Arbitrator will be enforceable by the High Court.) 
76 See Julian Wallace & Glen Rosen, Recent Amendment to the International Arbitration 
Act and Their Influence on the Insurance Industry, SIAC, http://www.siac.org.sg/2013-09-
18-01-57-20/2013-09-22-00-27-02/articles/199-recent-amendments-to-the-international-
arbitration-act-and-their-influence-on-the-insurance-industry (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). 
77 Id. 
78 See About The American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the International Centre for 
Dispute Resolution (ICDR), AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.adr.org/about_aaa (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
79 Id.  
80 See Guillaume Lemenez & Paul Quigley, The ICDR's Emergency Arbitrator Procedure 
in Action, Part II: Enforcing Emergency Arbitrator Decisions, 63-NOV DISP. RESOL. J. 66, 
66 (2008). 
81 ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37. 
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or agreements entered on or after May 1, 2006.” 82   For all 
agreements entered prior to May 1, 2006, the parties must 
specifically agree to Article 37's emergency arbitrator procedure in 
order for it to apply83.  For all agreements entered on or after May 1, 
2006, Article 37 applies unless the parties opt out of it in their 
arbitration agreement. 84   Some have suggested that this feature 
“favorably distinguishes” the ICDR procedure “from other opt-in 
mechanisms for obtaining interim relief, which are seldom used.”85   
 
Article 37 of the ICDR Rules also applies when the parties’ 
agreement provides for arbitration before the ICDR, whether or not 
they have designated the ICDR Rules.86  In addition, these rules 
apply to international arbitrations whenever the parties’ agreement 
calls for AAA arbitration but does not choose a particular set of 
AAA rules. 87   The ICDR does not define what constitutes an 
international arbitration.88  Given the broad scope of international 
arbitration, ICDR Rules and Article 37, as a practical matter, can 
possibly apply to disputes involving parties from different countries, 
or touch upon international issues, whether they are legal or factual.  
When a party applies through the emergency arbitrator provisions 
under the administration of the ICDR, a party must initially submit a 
written emergency relief application to the ICDR specifying the 
type of emergency relief that it is seeking, why that relief is 
necessary, and why the party is entitled to that relief.89  After the 
application, a single emergency arbitrator from a special panel of 
emergency arbitrators designated to rule on emergency applications 
will be appointed within one business day.90  Should a party wish to 
object to that appointment, it must notify all parties involved in the 
proceedings of the reasons for its objection.91   The emergency 
arbitrator will then, within two business days of appointment, 
                                                
82 Id. 
83 ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(a). 
84 See Peter Sherwin & Douglas Campbell Rennie, Interim Relief Under International 
Arbitration Rules and Guidlines: A Comparative Analysis, 20 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 340, 
340-2 (2009). 
85 See Mark Friedman et al., International Arbitration, 41 INT’L LAW. 251, 286–7 (2007). 
86 See Sherwin & Rennie, supra note 84, at 341; see also Lemenez & Quigley, supra note 
80, at 64. 
87 See Sherwin & Rennie, supra note 84, at 340. 
88 See ICDR Rules, supra note 15. 
89 Id. art. 37(b). 
90 Id. art. 37(c). 
91 Id. 
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establish a schedule for consideration of the application for 
emergency relief.92  The ICDR Rules do not set any time limit for 
the emergency arbitrator to decide the application. 
 
Similar to the authority of the tribunal, the emergency 
arbitrator may award any interim or conservatory measures that the 
emergency arbitrator “deems necessary.”93  These measures may 
come in the form of an order or an award, “including injunctive 
relief and measures for the protection or conservation of property.”94  
The emergency arbitrator also has the power to “modify or vacate 
the interim award or order for good cause shown.”95  Article 37 also 
explicitly provides that the parties may apply to a national court for 
interim relief.96 
 
Once the tribunal has been constituted, however, the 
emergency arbitrator has no further power.97  The tribunal “may 
reconsider, modify or vacate the interim award or order of 
emergency relief issued by the emergency arbitrator.” 98   The 
emergency arbitrator also may not  serve as a member of the 
tribunal unless the parties agree otherwise.99  Article 37 has had 
success in producing emergency relief since its implementation in 
May of 2006. 100   As of October 2008, Article 37 emergency 
arbitrators have been appointed in six ICDR cases.101 
C. Emergency Arbitrator Procedures Under the China (Shanghai) 
Pilot Free Trade Zone Arbitration Rules 
Timing of Application for Emergency Arbitrator Procedures 
Under the FTZ Arbitration Rules, during the period between 
the acceptance of a case and the constitution of the tribunal, a party 
may submit a written application to seek interim relief from an 
                                                
92 Id. art. 37(d). 
93 See ICDR Rules, supra note 15, at art. 37(e) 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. art. 37(h). 
97 See ICDR Rules, supra note 15, at art. 37(f) 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Lemenez & Quigley, supra note 31, at 69. 
101 See Grant Hanessian & Lawrence W. Newman, International Arbitration Checklists, 
p.63 (2th ed. 2009). 
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emergency arbitrator.102  The acceptance of a case is defined under 
the FTZ Arbitration Rules as the completion of all the formalities of 
an Application for Arbitration requested by SHIAC.103   
 
Subsequently, the Secretariat will send a Notice of 
Acceptance to the claimant within five days after the completion of 
formalities of an Application for Arbitration.  The Secretariat has 
the duty to send Notice of Arbitration to the respondent within five 
days after the Notice of Acceptance is sent104.  Similarly, the ICC 
Rules allow parties to file an application for emergency arbitrator 
procedure even prior to the filing of a Notice of Arbitration, so long 
as that Notice of Arbitration is filed within ten days of the 
application for emergency arbitrator procedures.105  The ICC Rules 
are more flexible than the SIAC Rules, which otherwise only 
provide that an application may be submitted concurrent with or 
after the commencement of the arbitration.106  However, the FTZ 
Arbitration Rules are not as flexible as the ICDR Rules, which 
provide that an application for emergency arbitrator procedure may 
be submitted any time prior to the constitution of the tribunal, and 
does not force parties to wait until the formal acceptance of 
arbitration to file an application for emergency arbitrator 
procedure.107  
Timeframes for Appointment of an Emergency Arbitrator and 
Issuance of Decision 
First, the FTZ Arbitration Rules provide that the Chairman 
of SHIAC may appoint an emergency arbitrator from the Panel of 
Arbitrators to constitute the emergency tribunal within three days 
upon the completion of formalities.108  However, the ICC, SIAC and 
ICDR Rules have imposed even shorter deadlines, requiring 
appointment within one or two days.109  
                                                
102 See FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 21(1). 
103 Id. at art. 12(2). 
104 Id. 
105 ICC Rules, supra note 15, app. V, art. 1(1)(6). 
106 SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(1). 
107 ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(b). 
108 FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 21(2).  
109 SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(2) (allowing one day to appoint emergency 
arbitrator); ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(3) (allowing one day to appoint emergency 
arbitrator); ICC Rules, supra note 15, app. V,  art. 2(1) (granting two days to appoint 
emergency arbitrator). 
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Second, the FTZ Rules have expedited the timeframe to 
challenge the appointment of the emergency arbitrator, allowing 
parties five days to challenge the appointment of an emergency 
arbitrator.110  This is still not in accordance with the ICC, SIAC, or 
ICDR Rules, which generally have given parties either one or three 
days to challenge the appointment of an emergency arbitrator.111  
Additionally, the FTZ Rules have not specified the timeframe for 
SHIAC to decide on the challenge.112 
 
Furthermore, the SIAC, ICC, and ICDR Rules go one step 
further, and require that an emergency arbitrator establish a 
schedule for considering the application for emergency relief within 
two days of appointment.113  However, the FTZ Arbitration Rules do 
not contain such a requirement. 
Finally, the FTZ Arbitration Rules provide that the 
emergency arbitrator must issue an emergency decision within 
twenty days of its appointment, or by the tribunal within twenty 
days of its receipt of the application for interim measures.114  This is 
generally in accordance with the ICC Rules, which impose a fifteen-
day deadline for emergency decisions,115 and is much clearer than 
the ICDR and SIAC Rules, which impose no concrete deadline at all.   
 
In summary, the FTZ Arbitration Rules set out relatively 
quick timelines for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator and 
the rendering of a decision, so that the parties can obtain interim 
relief as quickly as possible. 
Powers of the Emergency Arbitrator 
The FTZ Arbitration Rules are silent about whether or not an 
emergency arbitrator has the authority to conduct proceedings in 
                                                
110 FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 32(1). 
111 ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(3) (providing for one day to challenge 
appointment); SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(3) (providing, similarly, for one day’s 
time to challenge appointment); ICC Rules, supra note 15, app.V, at art. 3(1) (permitting 
up to three days to challenge an appointment). 
112 FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 32(1). 
113 SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(5) (2013); ICC Rules, supra note 15, app.V,  art. 
5(1); ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(4). 
114 FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 22(3). 
115 ICC Rules, supra note 15, app.V, art. 6(4). 
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any manner he considers appropriate, whereas other arbitration 
institutions have given the emergency arbitrator maximum 
flexibility over procedural matters.116  Although explicitly requiring 
the decision to be rendered in writing and in the required format,117 
the FTZ Arbitration Rules are silent regarding the type of relief an 
emergency arbitrator is authorized to grant.  This approach is 
similar to the ICC Rules, which are also silent on this issue, but 
differs from the ICDR and SIAC Rules, which both explicitly 
provide that the emergency arbitrator shall have the power to award 
any interim relief he or she deems necessary or appropriate.118   
 
However, the FTZ Arbitration Rules give emergency 
arbitrators the power to order that the party seeking emergency 
relief post an appropriate security,119 which aligns with international 
best practices, as evidenced by the rules of the ICC, SIAC and 
ICDR.120  
Enforcement of Emergency Decisions 
The FTZ Arbitration Rules are silent on whether: (1) an 
interim measure rendered by an emergency arbitrator has the same 
effect as an interim measure ordered by an arbitral tribunal, (2) 
whether the emergency decision is binding on the parties when 
rendered, and (3) whether the parties must undertake to comply with 
it.  However, it can be inferred that an interim measure rendered by 
an emergency arbitrator is equally enforceable, binding, and 
requires compliance from the fact that the FTZ Arbitration Rules do 
not actually distinguish pre-tribunal interim measures from interim 
measures granted by the tribunal.  Thus, the approach taken by the 
FTZ Arbitration Rules is very different from that taken by the ICC 
and SIAC Rules, which explicitly provide that a decision rendered 
                                                
116 Id. at app. V, art. 5(2) (granting broad discretionary powers to conduct proceedings as 
the arbitrator sees fit). 
117 FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 22(1). 
118 ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(5) (“The emergency arbitrator shall have the power 
to order or award any interim or conservancy measure the emergency arbitrator deems 
necessary, including injunctive relief and measures for the protection or conservation of 
property.”); SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(6) (“The Emergency Arbitrator shall 
have the power to order or award any interim relief that he deems necessary.”). 
119 FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 22(2). 
120 ICC Rules, supra note 15, app.V, art. 6(7) (2012); SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 
1(8); ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(7). 
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by the emergency arbitrator is binding on the parties, who then must 
undertake to comply without delay.121 
Effect of an Emergency Decision After Constitution of Tribunal 
Under the FTZ Arbitration Rules, the emergency arbitrator 
has the discretion to decide whether his emergency decisions should 
be modified, suspended, or withdrawn.122  This conforms with the 
ICC, SIAC, and ICDR Rules, which also provide that the 
emergency arbitrator may modify his own decision.123  
 
The FTZ Arbitration Rules also provide that decisions made 
by an emergency arbitrator may be modified, suspended, or 
withdrawn by the arbitral tribunal.124  Again, this conforms with the 
ICC, SIAC, and ICDR Rules, which contain similar provisions that 
confer the arbitral tribunal with the discretion to modify, suspend, or 
withdraw the emergency arbitrator’s decision.125  However, other 
institutional arbitration rules go slightly further than the FTZ 
Arbitration Rules by explicitly providing in their rules that the 
emergency arbitrator’s findings do not bind the tribunal.  For 
example, the ICC Rules provide that the “emergency arbitrator’s 
order shall not bind the arbitral tribunal with respect to any question, 
issue or dispute determined in the order.”126  Similarly, the SIAC 
Rules provide that “the Tribunal is not bound by the reasons given 
by the Emergency Arbitrator.”127  In contrast, the FTZ Arbitration 
Rules do not explicitly state that the tribunal is not bound by the 
emergency arbitrator’s decisions, though this principle is implicit in 
the rules granting the arbitral tribunal power to modify, suspend, or 
terminate the emergency arbitrator’s decision. 128   The FTZ 
Arbitration Rules also state that an emergency decision made by an 
emergency arbitrator is subject to objection by the respondent on the 
condition that the respondent files a written objection with SHIAC 
                                                
121 ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29(2); SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(9). 
122 FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 23(3). 
123 ICC Rules, supra note 15, app.V, art. 6(8); SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(6); 
ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(5). 
124 FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 23(4). 
125 ICC Rules, supra note 15, app.V, art.6(8); SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched.1(6); 
ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(5). 
126 ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29(3). 
127 SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(7).  
128 FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 23(3). 
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within three days of the respondent’s receipt of the decision.129  The 
emergency tribunal, in rendering such decision on an interim 
measure, has the discretion to decide whether to accept the 
objection.130  Even after the emergency tribunal rendering such a 
decision on an interim measure has dissolved, however, the tribunal 
that is subsequently constituted shall have the same discretion.131.  
Status of the Emergency Arbitrator After Constitution of Tribunal 
Under the FTZ Arbitration Rules, an emergency arbitrator’s 
power ceases once the tribunal has been constitutedand the 
emergency arbitrator should hand over all materials of the dispute to 
the tribunal.132  Similarly, the SIAC and ICDR Rules provide that the 
emergency arbitrator has no further power once the tribunal has 
been constituted. 133   Furthermore, the FTZ Arbitration Rules 
explicitly uphold the superiority of arbitration over the emergency 
arbitrator procedure by requiring that the emergency procedure 
should not affect the continuation of the arbitration proceedings in 
the future.134 
 
The FTZ Arbitration Rules also clearly provide that an 
emergency arbitrator should not act as an arbitrator in an arbitration 
relating to the dispute that gave rise to the emergency 
appointment.135  This resembles the rules of the ICC, SIAC, and 
ICDR, all of which contain similar provisions.136 
 
D. Suggestions for Refinement of Emergency Arbitrator 
Procedures Under the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade 
Zone Arbitration Rules 
                                                
129 Id. art. 23(1). 
130 Id. 
131 Id.  
132 FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 21(5). 
133 SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(7) (2013); ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(6). 
134 FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 21(7). 
135 Id. art. 21(6).  
136 ICC Rules, supra note 15, app.V, art. 2(6); SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(4); 
ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(6). 
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As shown above, the new FTZ Arbitration Rules governing 
the emergency arbitrator procedure clearly adopt many of the best 
practices utilized at other major international arbitration institutions.  
Nevertheless, there are still a number of revisions that could be 
made to further clarify the emergency arbitrator procedure under the 
FTZ Arbitration Rules. 
Timing of Application for an Emergency Arbitrator 
Because emergency arbitrator procedure is intended to 
address situations of extreme urgency, it makes little sense to force 
parties to wait until the formal acceptance of arbitration to seek 
interim relief through that procedure.  Such a formalistic restriction 
does not seem to serve any practical purpose, and any concerns 
regarding abuse of the emergency arbitrator process could be 
addressed by adding a caveat, similar to that included in the ICC 
Rules, where an application for an emergency arbitrator is only 
valid if a Notice of Arbitration is served shortly thereafter.137  As 
such, it may be advisable to revise the FTZ Arbitration Rules to 
permit the filing of applications for emergency arbitrators prior to 
the formal acceptance of arbitration and after an Application of 
Arbitration is filed, so long as the Application of Arbitration is duly 
accepted and a Notice of Arbitration is filed shortly afterwards.   
 
This revision would make the emergency arbitrator 
procedure better able to address situations of extreme urgency, 
instead of forcing parties to apply to local courts just because an 
Application of Arbitration has not yet been accepted. 
Timeframes for Appointment of an Emergency Arbitrator and 
Issuance of Decision 
While an improvement over the SHIAC Rules, the FTZ 
Arbitration Rules’s provisions regarding timeframes for the 
appointment of emergency arbitrators and issuance of decisions still 
have room for improvement.  Due to the urgent nature of emergency 
relief, it may be necessary to explicitly require in the FTZ 
                                                
137 ICC Rules, supra note 15, app.V, at art.1(6) (“The President shall terminate the 
emergency arbitrator proceedings if a Request for Arbitration has not been received by the 
Secretariat from the applicant within 10 days of the Secretariat’s receipt of the Application, 
unless the emergency arbitrator determines that a longer period of time is necessary.”). 
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Arbitration Rules that the emergency arbitrator sets up a schedule 
for considering the application for emergency relief within a certain 
period of time after the appointment so that the process will be 
expedited.  
Powers of Emergency Arbitrators 
The FTZ Arbitration Rules already seem to imply that the 
emergency arbitrator is authorized to grant any interim relief he or 
she deems appropriate, but it may be worth making this broad grant 
of authority explicit in the Rules to avoid ambiguities.  Moreover, it 
may be worth adding provisions to limit the power of emergency 
arbitrators under certain circumstances.  For example, the ICC 
Rules explicitly state that the emergency arbitrator procedure 
applies only to signatories to the arbitration agreement or their 
successors.138  In other words, the emergency arbitrator does not 
have the power to grant interim orders over third parties to the 
arbitral proceedings.  It may be advisable to add a similar provision 
to the FTZ Arbitration Rules, to limit clearly the jurisdiction of 
emergency arbitrators. 
Enforcement of Emergency Decisions 
By not distinguishing an emergency arbitrator’s interim 
measures or decisions from the tribunal’s interim measures or 
decisions, the FTZ Arbitration Rules seem to imply that an interim 
measure ordered by an emergency arbitrator has the same effect as 
an interim measure ordered by an arbitral tribunal: the emergency 
decision is binding on the parties when rendered, and the parties 
undertake to comply with it.  However, it also may be worth making 
this broad grant of authority explicit in the Rules to avoid 
ambiguities.  
Effect of Emergency Decisions After Constitution of the Arbitration 
Tribunal 
The FTZ Arbitration Rules do not explicitly state that the 
tribunal is not bound by the emergency arbitrator’s decisions, 
though this principle is implicit in the rules granting the arbitral 
tribunal power to modify, suspend, or terminate the emergency 
                                                
138 ICC Rules, supra note 15, art.29(5). 
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arbitrator’s decision.  It may nevertheless be worth making this 
principle explicit in the FTZ Arbitration Rules, especially with 
regard to making it clear that the arbitral tribunal is bound by 
neither the decisions nor the reasons given by the emergency 
arbitrator.  
III. OPEN-LIST ARBITRATOR APPOINTMENTS 
A. Arbitrator Appointment Methods in Institutional Arbitration 
One of international arbitration’s most crucial stages 
concerns the appointment of the arbitrators.139  While the ability of 
the parties to select their arbitrators is recognized as one of 
arbitration’s most desirable features, the selection phase can be 
challenging.140 
 
There are two forms of arbitration: ad hoc arbitration and 
institutional arbitration. Both forms have a separate mechanism for 
the appointment of arbitrators.141  In ad hoc arbitration, parties make 
their own arrangements for the selection of arbitrators and for the 
designation of rules, applicable law, procedures, and administrative 
support.142  In contrast, in institutional arbitration, an arbitration 
institution administers the arbitral process according to its 
institutional rules.143  Although most arbitration institutions firmly 
uphold the parties’ rights to choose their arbitrators, their arbitrator 
appointment procedures vary at least to the scope of the pool from 
which parties can choose their arbitrators144 .  Some arbitration 
institutions, ICDR for example, allow the parties to select their 
arbitrators freely as the default rule; and if the parties should fail, 
the parties are required to select the arbitrators from ICDR’s 
previously designated panel of arbitrators comprised of experts 
drawn from different parts of the world (Open-List Method).145   
                                                
139 See Moses, supra note 17, at 116. 
140 Id. at 128–130. 
141 See THOMAS L. GRAVELLE & MARY A. BEDIKIAN, 8A MICH. PL. & PR., § 62C:136 (2nd 
ed. 2013). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 See e.g. ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 12, 13; SIAC Rules, supra note 15,§6,7,8; 
Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), effective Jan. 1, 2015), 
http://www.cietac.org/index.cms, art. 26 [hereinafter CIETAC Rules]. 
145 ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 12, 13.  
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Other arbitration institutions, such as CIETAC, use a more 
restricted approach under which the arbitrator appointment is 
controlled under a closed panel system where, as the default rule, 
the parties are only allowed to appoint arbitrators from a panel 
previously designated by the relevant arbitration institution (Closed-
List Method).146 
B. A Comparison of Open-List Method and Closed-List Method 
Pros and Cons of Open-List Method  
The Open-List Method in recent years has been the subject 
of great debate.   At the outset, it is undeniable that the principle of 
party autonomy is at the heart of international arbitration.147  An 
arbitral tribunal exists because the parties have consented to 
arbitrate certain disputes, rather than litigate those disputes in a 
court as they otherwise have the right to do, and in principle, parties 
are free to agree on how they want to appoint a tribunal.148  Many 
parties view the right to choose their own arbitrators as one of the 
key attractions of international arbitration.149  The proponents of 
Open-List Method argue that it is consistent with the principle of 
party autonomy and, as arbitration awards are final and not subject 
to appeal unless the award is vacated, parties must have a high level 
of trust and confidence in the arbitrators they nominate.150  The 
Open-List Method maximizes party autonomy by allowing parties 
to freely choose their arbitrators and build trust and confidence in 
them.151  
 
                                                
146 See Weixia Gu, The China-Style Closed Panel System in Arbitral Tribunal Formation – 
Analysis of Chinese Adaptation to Globalization, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 121, 131 (2008). 
147 See Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, The Role of Party Autonomy in International Arbitration, 
52 SUM DISP. RESOL. J. 24, 25 (1997). 
148 See William W. Park, National Legal Systems and Private Dispute Resolution, 82 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 616, 629 (1988) (book review). 
149 See Bockstiegel, supra note 147. 
150 See Alexis Mourre, et.al, Are unilateral appointments defensible? On Jan Paulsson’s 
Moral Hazard in International Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 5, 2010), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/10/05/are-unilateral-appointments-defensible-
on-jan-paulsson%e2%80%99s-moral-hazard-in-international-arbitration////. 
151 See Henry Gabriel & Anjanette H. Raymond, Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: Basic 
Principles and Emerging Standard, 5 WYO. L. REV. 452, 467 (2005). 
90 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 7 
 
Moreover, the level of complexity in many of today’s 
international arbitrations requires arbitrators with extensive subject 
matter expertise, cultural sensitivity, and a strong foundation in the 
conduct of an international arbitration proceeding.  Although the 
panel under Closed-List Method is often comprised of experts in a 
specific area, the Open-List Method brings to the parties a greater 
possibility of finding their ideal arbitrators. 152   Nevertheless, 
opponents of the Open-List Method have cited the inexperience of 
the parties and their inability to make rational decisions regarding 
arbitrator appointment as the basis for supporting the Closed List 
Method.153  
 
Lastly, the parties always have the expectation that their 
nominated arbitrator will see the case their way and will also be able 
to sway the other members of the arbitral tribunal.154  Regardless of 
the accuracy of this widely shared understanding, under the Open-
List Method there is a greater likelihood for the parties to find the 
arbitrators who share their view and will zealously advocate for 
them in the arbitration process. 
 
However, that is unfortunately where the opponents of 
Open-List Method have identified potential problems that may arise, 
as it is the norm in international arbitration that all arbitrators be 
impartial and independent.155  Some open-list arbitrators may have 
the mistaken belief that they have an obligation to the party that 
appointed them, which will impede their ability to be impartial, 
encourage dilatory tactics or, as some scholars have suggested, 
encourage them to draft a dissenting opinion in support of their 
parties’ position.156 
Pros and Cons of Closed-List Method 
Proponents may argue that the Closed-List Method can 
avoid appointment bias of the open-list arbitrators in favor of the 
appointing party because the Closed-List Method creates an 
                                                
152 See Weixia Gu, supra note 146, at 138 (exp). 
153 See Weixia Gu, supra note 146, at 140. 
154 See Gabriel & Raymond, supra note 151 (exp). 
155 Id, at 457- 458. 
156 See Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Law Dispute Resolution, Lecture, 
Univ. of Miami School of Law, 11–2 (Apr. 29, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://icsidreview.oxfordjournals.org/content/25/2/339.full.pdf). 
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important buffer between the arbitrators and the parties, thus 
removing the potential for the partiality and bias problems. 157  
However, a criticism of this view is that requiring parties to appoint 
arbitrators from a closed list would not eliminate or significantly 
reduce any bias usually seen in open-list arbitrator selection.  
Appointment bias arises because an arbitrator believes that 
reappointment, by the same party or by others, depends on how 
much he or she favors the party that appointed him or her.158  It is 
hard to see how inclusion on a closed list would provide such 
assurances to arbitrators that they would not consider the effect of 
their decisions on future appointments, unless the lists were so 
limited as to virtually guarantee appointments.  Having a list that is 
small enough effectively to eliminate the parties’ freedom of choice 
cannot be the objective.159.  
 
Furthermore, the Closed-List Method prevents the ex parte 
contact between the parties and the arbitrators and any confusion 
over their role or responsibilities towards the party that selected 
them.160  This can be a significant advantage in an international 
arbitration, especially during enforcement proceedings where these 
contacts may later be used to establish the foundation for possible 
bias or partiality during an action to vacate an arbitral award.161  
Finally, proponents for the Closed-List Method have argued that it 
promotes greater coherence in decisionmaking and provides parties 
with the ability to access potential arbitrators quickly.162 
 
                                                
157 See Jan Paulsson, Are Unilateral Appointments Defensible?, KLUWER ARBITRATION 
BLOG (Apr. 2, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/04/02/are-unilateral-
appointments-defensible////. 
158 See Daniel R. Karon, Note, Kicking Our Gift Horse in the Mouth - Arbitration and 
Arbitrator Bias: Its Sources, Symptoms, and Solutions, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 315, 
329 (1992). 
159 See Ank A. Santens, The Move Away from Closed-List Arbitrator Appointments: Happy 
Ending or a Trend to Be Reversed?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Jun. 28, 2011), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/06/28/the-move-away-from-closed-list-
arbitrator-appointments-happy-ending-or-a-trend-to-be-reversed/. 
160 See Hans Smit, The Pernicious Institution of the Party Appointed Arbitrator, COLUM. 
FDI PERSPECTIVES, No.33 at 2 (2010) available at 
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac%3A134503. 
161 See Ann Ryan Robertson, International Arbitration in the U.S., 45-OCT Hous. Law. 22, 
22 (2007). 
162 See Tribunal Fédérale [TF][Federal Supreme Court] May 27, 2003, 129 ARRÊTS DU 
TRIBUNAL FÉDÉRAL SUISSE [ATF] III 445 (Switz.). 
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However, there seem to be more drawbacks in connection 
with the Closed-List Method. The Closed-List Method can make 
finding a suitable arbitrator extremely difficult.  Finding a suitable 
arbitrator among only about several hundred candidates can be 
difficult after one takes into account the diverse nature of disputes 
even within a specialized field, the avoidance of repeat 
appointments, and other conflicts of interest, availability, and 
desired qualifications in terms of technical expertise, nationality, 
personality, case management skills, and familiarity with the 
relevant legal systems.163  While the Closed-List Method provides 
the parties with a readily available list of arbitrators, they still might 
not be the arbitrators that the parties are contemplating. 
The Closed-List Method also gives the arbitration institutions too 
much discretion in choosing the closed panel.164  It is very likely that 
some arbitration institutions would abuse such discretion to 
influence the outcome of the arbitration or simply serve their own 
interest.165  The Closed-List Method also arguably poses a hurdle to 
new entrants who need to convince an arbitration institution to 
include them on their list before being able to receive an 
appointment from the arbitration institution or parties arbitrating 
before it. 
 
Lastly, internal bodies at arbitration institutions are simply 
not in a good position to understand the issues and parties in a 
particular case.  Institutional staffs are not as well placed to assess 
these aspects of an arbitrator’s performance and, in considering who 
to appoint, they may prioritize qualities that are helpful from an 
administrative and institutional perspective, but may be very 
different from the qualities valued by parties and their counsels. 
The Closed-List Method Versus Open-List Method of Aribtrator 
Appointment 
The Closed-List Method is a practice that the legal 
community should continue to move away from, rather than move 
back to.  First, it is necessary to address the bias issue that the 
                                                
163 See Moses, supra note 17, at 116-128. 
164 See Michael I. Kaplan, Solving the Pitfalls of Impartiality When Arbitrating in China: 
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165 Id. at 785. 
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current party appointment system raises, but at the same time, the 
Closed-List Method is not the solution.  It is questionable that using 
a closed list of arbitrators would reduce bias in party-appointed 
arbitrators.  Any bias-reducing effect that a closed list may have is 
likely to be largely offset by the problems that it creates.  On the 
other hand, the positive effects of the Closed-List Method can also 
be accomplished in the Open-List Method with the use of a well-
maintained reference list by which the parties are not confined to.  
A reference list, instead of a closed list, would provide a huge 
convenience to the parties as well as easy access to qualified 
candidates, while showing more respect for party autonomy.  
 
Second, the Open-List Method serves a broader purpose 
than the Closed-List Method.  By appointing an arbitrator from an 
open pool, the parties get a sense of proximity with the arbitral 
process.  The Open-List Method gives the parties the perception that 
they, not the arbitration institution, control the arbitration, which is 
an important difference between arbitration and litigation.  But the 
parties’ trust in the arbitral process is more than just each individual 
party’s own trust in its own appointee.  
 
The parties’ trust in the arbitral process is 
not the arithmetical addition of each individual 
party’s own trust in its own appointee; it is more a 
matter of collective trust in the system as a whole, a 
trust which rests on a variety of factors, among 
which the perception of proximity and control is an 
important one.166 
 
Third, the Closed-List Method could create a distance 
between the arbitrators and the users of arbitration.  Closed-list 
arbitrators tend to pay more attention to the arbitration institutions, 
which all have their own degree of bureaucracy, rather than the 
parties.  The risk would exist that arbitrators would progressively 
move from their current culture of services providers, close to the 
needs and requirements of the users, to a culture of arbitral public 
servants or, even worse, of arbitral politicians.167  
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C. Closed-List Arbitration Appointment in China 
One of the most attractive advantages of arbitration is that 
parties can choose their own arbitrators.  In the Chinese context, 
however, the appointment of arbitrators is controlled under a 
closed-panel system where parties are only allowed to appoint 
arbitrators listed on a closed panel that is previously appointed by 
the relevant arbitration institutions, 168  which is deemed a 
quintessential application of the Closed-List Method.  
A closed-panel system is not legally compulsory, as the 
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (CAL) 169 does 
not expressly provide for a closed panel system.  However, upon 
closer examination, the closed-panel system may be inferred from 
Articles 11 and 13 of the CAL.170  The last paragraph of Article 13 
states that an arbitration commission must have a registered panel 
list of arbitrators.171  This corresponds to Section 4 of Article 11, 
which requires that a Chinese arbitration commission must have its 
own appointed arbitrators listed on the panels to be formulated.172  
Therefore, the names on the panel lists become a pool for the parties’ 
appointment of arbitrators when forming the tribunal in an 
individual case.173  Despite the above inference, since the CAL does 
not provide explicitly that arbitrators must be appointed from the 
listed panels of the particular commission, the arbitration 
institutions in China still have the discretion of not only controlling 
the qualification of arbitrators but also the procedure of arbitrator 
appointment. 
 
Generally speaking, China’s closed-panel system has three 
distinct features.  First, Chinese arbitration institutions tend to 
appoint their own staff members as closed-list arbitrators and these 
staff-arbitrators are engaged in both administrative and professional 
roles.174  Such practice originates from Article 13(1) of the CAL, 
                                                
168 Gu, supra note 146, at 120. 
169 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhong Cai Fa (中华人民共和国仲裁法) [Arbitration 
Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Committee of the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995) 
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/china.arbitration.law.1994 [hereinafter China Arbitration Law]. 
170 Gu, supra note 146, at 128. 
171 China Arbitration Law, supra note 169, art.13. 
172 Id. at art.11(4).  
173 Gu, supra note 146, at 130. 
174 Id. at 146. 
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which articulates that having previous experience in arbitration 
work can be a basis for qualifying as an arbitrator in China.175  And, 
this is regarded as an effective means to ensure the standard of its 
arbitrators as well as useful to control the quality of arbitration 
within the arbitration commission concerned.176  Notably, these staff 
arbitrators are usually the powerholders and decisionmakers within 
an arbitration institution.  Therefore, considering the powerful role 
of these staff arbitrators and their special relationship with the 
arbitration commission, non-staff arbitrators may be hesitant to 
dissent from the opinions of their staff counterparts to avoid 
breaking the harmonious relationship within the tribunal177 
 
Second, besides staff arbitrators, many of the panel members 
are government officials or retired officials from administrative 
authorities178.  The arbitration institutions usually appoint officials to 
the panel in order to establish good relations with the administrative 
authorities to better carry out their work.179  Because government 
officials are substantially involved,“[the] interdependent 
relationship is established between the arbitration institution and the 
official arbitrators appointed to the commission’s panel list”180 is 
merely illusory.  
 
Third, “following the dual-track legislative distinction under 
the CAL, separate panels are maintained for the appointment of 
arbitrators from domestic and foreign nationals."181   As a result, 
“[t]he overwhelming understanding therefore is that preferential 
treatment has been reserved for parties in foreign-related 
arbitration.”182  Moreover, “[t]he dual-track criteria for arbitrators’ 
appointments were aimed at internationalizing China’s foreign-
related arbitrations, and expediting and expanding China’s 
economic and trade relations with other countries.”183 
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Recently, a few institutional arbitration rules in China, 
which previously only permitted persons listed with a particular 
arbitration institution to act as arbitrators in the arbitral proceedings 
conducted by that same institution, have began to allow parties to 
pick arbitrators off the list, pending confirmation of the chairman of 
the arbitration institution involved.  For instance, the CIETAC 
Rules, after the 2012 update, provide that “[w]here the parties have 
agreed to nominate arbitrators outside CIETAC’s panel, an 
arbitrator so nominated by the parties or nominated according to the 
agreement of the parties may act as arbitrator subject to the 
confirmation by the Chairman of CIETAC in accordance with the 
law.”184 
 
Few institutional rules require that the arbitrator must appear 
on a list maintained by the institution.185  China is perhaps one of the 
few jurisdictions in the world that restrict the parties’ choice of 
arbitrators to a fixed panel maintained by the arbitration institutions.  
In summary, the Chinese practice of closed-list arbitrator 
appointment gives a strong impression of state control.  It is also 
noteworthy that state control has been extended and stressed 
through the practice of institutional control by arbitration 
institutions. 
 
D. Open-List Method Under the China (Shanghai) Pilot 
Free Trade Zone Arbitration Rules and 
Recommendation for Refinements 
The FTZ Arbitration Rules provides a dual mechanism model 
for arbitrator appointment, allowing the parties to choose their 
arbitrators either from or outside a list of arbitrators provided by 
SHIAC.  Pursuant to Article 27 of the FTZ Arbitration Rules, 
parties “may either appoint arbitrators from the Panel of Arbitrators 
or recommend persons from outside the Panel of Arbitrators as the 
                                                
184 Zhongguo Guo Ji Jing Ji Mao Yi Zhong Cai Wei Yuan Zhong Cai Gui Ze (中国国际经
济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁规则) [China Int’l Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
(CIETAC) Arbitration Rules] (promulgated by CIETAC, Feb. 3, 2012, effective May 1, 
2012) http://cn.cietac.org/Rules/rules.pdf, art. 24 [hereinafter CIETAC Arbitration Rules].  
185 See JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 234–5 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 2003) . 
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arbitrator.”186   Parties “may also reach an agreement on jointly 
recommending a person from outside the Panel of Arbitrators as the 
presiding/sole arbitrator.”187  This literally means that the parties will 
no longer be bound by a closed list of arbitrators provided by 
SHIAC, despite the existence of some ambiguities as to (1) whether 
further approval from the Chairman of SHIAC is necessary under 
some circumstances and (2) if such approval is necessary, what the 
appropriate scope of the Chairman of SHIAC’s review is.  
Approval From the Chairman of SHIAC 
It is notable that Article 27 uses “recommend” rather than 
“appoint” or “nominate.”  Arguably recommendations always come 
with subsequent ratification or approval actions.  However, as 
opposed to the CIETAC Rules that explicitly provide that any 
nomination of arbitrators outside its panel is subject to the Chairman 
of CIETAC’s confirmation,188 the FTZ Arbitration Rules were silent 
in Article 27 as to whether the parties’ recommendation is subject to 
further approval from SHIAC.189  By contrast, Article 28 of the FTZ 
Arbitration Rules prescribe that, in a three-arbitrator tribunal:  
 
[I]f either party has recommended a person 
from outside the Panel of Arbitrators to act as 
arbitrator, the party shall submit the information 
regarding this person to the Secretariat and the 
relevant person may act as an arbitrator only when 
the Chairman of SHIAC confirms that this is in 
accordance with laws.190  
 
Given that only in the situation of a three-arbitrator tribunal 
do the FTZ Arbitration Rules explicitly require the Chairman of 
SHIAC to approve a party-recommended outside arbitrator and 
given their silence about such approval requirement in Article 27, a 
more general arbitrator appointment provision, it can be reasonably 
inferred from the relevant provisions that other than the 
appointment of a three-arbitrator tribunal, the Chairman of SHIAC’s 
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approval is not necessary and the parties thus can make their own 
choices.  
The Scope of Review  
Even though in a three-arbitrator tribunal scenario, the 
parties are still obligated to submit their recommendations of 
outside arbitrators to the Chairman of SHIAC for approval, while 
the scope of the Chairman’s review is very narrow. Pursuant to 
Article 28, the Chairman of SHIAC only has the authority to 
confirm that recommendations of outside arbitrator are in 
accordance with the law.191  Under such an objective standard, under 
no condition except that a recommendation is unlawful can the 
Chairman of SHIAC reject a recommendation of an outside 
arbitrator.  Other Chinese institutional arbitration rules however, 
such as the CIETAC Rules, generally confer the chairman with a 
discretionary confirmation authority as long as he exercises it in 
accordance with law.192 
 
The FTZ Arbitration Rules have only became effective 
recently, in May 2014, and could be interpreted in many different 
ways in the future.  However, the language in the FTZ Arbitration 
Rules certainly reveals the intention of SHIAC to at least move 
away from Closed-List Method toward a more liberalized procedure 
of arbitrator appointment.  
 
The FTZ Arbitration Rules are capable of going further with 
their liberalization initiatives.  Also the apparent ambiguities need to 
be eliminated.  Accordingly, the following are recommendations for 
refinement of the current FTZ Arbitration Rules with regard to 
arbitrator appointments.  
 
First, the dual mechanism model is redundant.  By allowing 
the parties to choose their own arbitrators, the FTZ Arbitration 
Rules have rendered SHIAC’s closed list of arbitrators meaningless.  
The better way is to include a reference list that includes all SHIAC-
appointed arbitrators as suggestions for the parties to consider and 
to state that the parties are free to select other arbitrators not on the 
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list. The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC), for 
example, has established a panel of arbitrators selected for high 
expertise and professionalism. 193   Besides the panel members 
published on its website, the HKIAC also maintains a database of 
other arbitrators who, although not meeting the Panel Selection 
Committee’s criteria for inclusion on the panel, may yet be 
suggested to parties in suitable cases requiring specialist expertise.194   
As such, parties may have a larger pool from which they can 
draw their prospective arbitrators.  Most significantly, however, the 
parties are allowed to appoint arbitrators from outside the 
institution’s panels and databases.195  Thus, the principle of party 
autonomy is both observed and balanced against an institutional 
culture of maintaining a pool of high-standard arbitrators available 
for the parties to select from.  
 
In addition, the FTZ Arbitration Rules need to be revised to 
explain the meaning of a “recommendation” and to make clear 
whether further approval from the Chairman of SHIAC is required.  
It matters because the existence of an approval requirement in the 
FTZ Arbitration Rules will certainly discount the function of the 
Open-List Method.  
 
Lastly, as the Open-List Method is relatively new to the 
parties conducting institutional arbitration in China, it would help 
the inexperienced parties to properly appoint their arbitrators if the 
FTZ Arbitration Rules included detailed guidelines of the 
qualifications that a competent arbitrator should possess in order to 
produce a fair judgment for both parties.  This would not only 
promote the principle of party autonomy, but would also help the 
arbitration institutions in China to better perform their 
administrative duties. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The implications of both emergency arbitrator procedure and 
open-list arbitrator appointment included in the FTZ Arbitration 
Rules are groundbreaking.  One implication is that it is the first time 
that an arbitration institution in China has ever used the Open-List 
Method in its arbitrator appointment rules, suggesting a possible 
trend of more arbitration institutions in China to follow suit.  
Another implication is that emergency arbitrator procedure and 
open-list arbitrator appointment appear to be just two outstanding 
examples of several breakthroughs SHIAC has made in the FTZ 
Arbitration Rules, nearly all of which were carefully made based on 
generally accepted international arbitration practice and principles.  
To some extent, this illustrates the fact that SHIAC is working hard 
to accommodate the expectations of foreign investors to have a 
modern, consistent, and fair dispute resolution system in Shanghai 
FTZ with a more diversified pool of arbitrators and thereby 
strengthen confidence in investing in Shanghai FTZ. 
